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WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
         In these habeas corpus cases, petitioners allege that 
they would not have pleaded nolo contendere if they had known 
that their pleas would prevent them from appealing a pre-trial 
ruling.  The state's intermediate appellate court found that the 
pleas were induced by faulty legal advice by trial counsel and 
that petitioners were entitled to new trials.  The state Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the petitioners' responses during a 
plea colloquy in the state trial court barred them from 
challenging the voluntariness of their pleas.  Because 
established federal law prohibits giving such preclusive effect 
to plea colloquies, we conclude that habeas corpus relief is 
appropriate.  
                      I.  Factual Background 
         Petitioners Larry Meggett and Anthony Dickerson were 
charged in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, 
Pennsylvania, with counts of participating in a corrupt 
organization, manufacture, delivery and possession of controlled 
substances, conspiracy and related offenses.  On the day set for 
trial, the presiding judge denied the petitioners' motions 
raising double jeopardy.   
         While petitioners were handcuffed together in the 
courtroom awaiting selection of a jury, they heard their co- 
defendants plead guilty and agree to turn state's evidence.  The 
prosecutor then offered petitioners a concession limiting the 
terms of incarceration imposed if they pleaded guilty.  
Petitioners asserted that they then decided to plead nolo 
contendere after assurances from their respective lawyers that 
the double jeopardy issue could be preserved for appeal.   
         During the plea colloquy, the trial judge told each 
defendant that "as far as sentencing is concerned [entering a 
nolo contendere plea] is the same as pleading guilty."  The judge 
then asked:  "Do you understand your only appeal rights are 
whether this [crime] happened in Bucks County; whether [the] 
sentence is lawful and whether you're entering this plea of your 
own free will?"  Petitioners replied that they so understood.   
         Petitioners did not take a direct appeal, but two 
months after sentencing they filed petitions under the 
Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act.  The Common Pleas Court 
conducted a consolidated evidentiary hearing at which both 
petitioners and their attorneys testified.  The court denied 
relief, finding the trial counsels' testimony to be credible and 
rejecting the portions of the petitioners' testimony that were 
contradictory. 
         At the hearing, Meggett testified that he, Dickerson 
and their respective lawyers were all present when they discussed 
the possibility of entering nolo contendere pleas.  Meggett asked 
his counsel whether he would be giving up his right to contest 
the double jeopardy matter if he pleaded nolo contendere.  His 
lawyer responded, "No, we would still be preserving our rights."  
Meggett testified that both lawyers replied that "if we took the 
nolo contendere we could still have the issues preserved."   
         During his testimony, Meggett's trial counsel was asked 
what he had told his client about the validity of the double 
jeopardy claim.  He answered, "I thought it was a good argument.  
I couldn't guarantee it was a winner and that he could attempt to 
argue it after he pled guilty.  And that if he wished to do that, 
he should get new counsel, because I certainly wouldn't be in a 
position to do it.  And I told him that I couldn't guarantee we 
would win either, if he did plea or if we didn't plea."  The 
lawyer was then asked:  "Did you believe at that time that he 
could continue his double jeopardy argument even after entering a 
nolo contendere plea?"  He responded:  "I believe that if counsel 
is creative, he probably could get away with that," but that he 
had not looked into how it could be done because it was "not my 
job." 
         Petitioner Dickerson testified that his lawyer said 
nolo contendere was not like a guilty plea because "you still 
have all your appealable issues" and that a nolo plea was not a 
waiver.  According to Dickerson, the attorney urged him to take 
the plea bargain offered by the prosecutor, telling him:  "You 
could still push the double jeopardy and still be heard."  
Dickerson said he would not have pleaded if he had known it meant 
waiving his double jeopardy appeal. 
         At the hearing, Dickerson's trial attorney was asked 
whether he had told his client that he could raise the double 
jeopardy issue on appeal.  He conceded, "I probably said it was 
possible, although I did tell him he was limited in his rights of 
appeal."  The lawyer also testified that about six weeks before 
the hearing, he had written a letter to Dickerson in which he 
said, "I believe that because pre-trial motions were denied 
without a hearing and without your presence, that you may yet 
have a double jeopardy issue brought before the Court."   
         Petitioners appealed the denial of their post 
conviction petitions to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.  That 
Court, reiterating settled Pennsylvania law, stated that with 
respect to the termination of appellate rights, a nolo contendere 
plea had the same effect as a guilty plea.  The Court 
nevertheless reversed in separate opinions.   
         In the Meggett case, the Superior Court stated that the 
issue was whether a client's "claim of a right to be properly 
advised by counsel regarding the merits of the double jeopardy 
claim is warranted, as this is what influenced [the petitioners'] 
decision to plead."  The opinion commented:  "There can be no 
legitimate basis for failing to apprise a defendant of the 
continuing validity of his claims."  The Court was critical of "a 
somewhat lackadaisical attitude" on the part of Meggett's lawyer.  
Finally, the opinion pointed out that "the propriety of the 
sentencing colloquy will not, in and of itself, resolve the 
question as to whether "[petitioner] made his plea voluntarily 
and knowingly . . . While the colloquy was not defective, it 
cannot be expected to anticipate and resolve issues in the mind 
of the defendant of which only the attorney is aware."   
         In the Dickerson opinion, the Superior Court found that 
he "was prejudiced by relying to his detriment on this erroneous 
advice" and that the "plea colloquy did not cure such prejudice."  
After reviewing the hearing testimony and evidence, the Court 
stated that "there can be no doubt as to the arguable merit of 
Dickerson's claim."  The opinion concluded that "but for" the 
attorneys' "faulty advice" on the continued vitality of the 
double jeopardy claims, petitioners "would not have entered a 
plea."  The Court vacated the sentences and remanded for 
withdrawal of the pleas and new trials in both cases. 
         The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur 
and, without briefing or argument, reversed the Superior Court's 
orders and reinstated the convictions.  Rejecting the conclusion 
that the pleas were defective, the state Supreme Court's succinct 
orders asserted that each petitioner "clearly stated in his 
guilty plea colloquy that he understood that his guilty plea 
would limit his appellate rights to challenges based on the 
jurisdiction of the court, the lawfulness of his sentence, and 
the voluntariness of his plea.  It is well established that a 
defendant cannot challenge his guilty plea by asserting that he 
lied while under oath."  The orders contain neither references to 
ineffective assistance of counsel, nor factual determinations of 
what advice was given to petitioners or whether they relied on it 
in entering their pleas. 
         Petitioners then sought relief in the district court, 
but these separate requests were denied.  We consolidated both 
cases for disposition. 
                     II.  Standard of Review 
         While the petitioners' appeals were pending in this 
Court, Congress enacted amendments to 28 U.S.C.  2254 changing 
the standard of review for cases challenging state convictions 
where constitutional violations are alleged to have occurred.  
These provisions state that federal courts may not grant relief 
"unless the [state court] adjudication of the claim -- (1) 
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . 
. or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding."  Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, sec 104(3),Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214, 1219 (1996).   
         Under the earlier version of 28 U.S.C.  2254(d), we 
presumed that a state court's factual finding was correct unless, 
inter alia, "such factual determination is not fairly supported 
by the record."  In contrast, state court legal rulings were 
accorded no deference under the former statute.  Parry v. 
Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1995).   
         We have concluded that the resolution of the issues in 
this case would not differ under either version of the statute.  
Accordingly, we will apply the current, more deferential test. 
                 III.  The State Courts' Findings 
         The circumstances here are somewhat unusual because we 
are confronted with factual findings of the state appellate court 
that diverge from those in the trial court.  For example, the 
Common Pleas court wrote:  "The record adduced at the pleas and 
at hearing on May 21, 1993 [the Post Conviction Relief Act 
proceeding], does not support a conclusion that defendants' pleas 
were induced by faulty advice from their trial counsel."  The 
Superior Court found to the contrary based on the same record.  
Although there clearly was a conflict between the versions of 
what had occurred, the Superior Court found the critical facts in 
favor of petitioners.   
         Federal courts in habeas corpus cases are required to 
give deference to the factual findings of both the state trial 
and appellate courts.  Parke v. Raley 506 U.S. 20, 36 (1993); 
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981) (section 2254 makes no 
distinction between the factual determinations of a state trial 
court and those of a state appellate court).  When there are 
conflicting fact findings by state courts, we believe that 
according proper deference requires us to accept the version 
reached by the higher court.  To rule otherwise would be to 
insert our Court into the state appellate system and take onto 
ourselves the role entrusted to the state Superior Court.  We 
find no justification for such an intrusion here.   
         Had the state Supreme Court made factual findings in 
reversing the Superior Court, we would be required to accept them 
as those of the highest court in the state.  As noted earlier, 
however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made no factual findings 
on the critical issues of whether petitioners relied on their 
counsels' faulty advice, or whether they would not have pleaded 
nolo contendere but for that incorrect statement of the law.  
Instead, the Court limited its comments to the effect of the 
petitioners' statements made during the plea colloquy.   
         It is significant for our purposes that the state 
Supreme Court did not set aside the Superior Court's factual 
conclusions about the inducement for the pleas and the causation 
element.  Thus, it appears that the state Supreme Court's ruling 
on the law is a narrow one -- having stated that they understood 
the limitations of their appellate rights, petitioners could not 
take a different position in the Post Conviction Relief Act 
proceedings.  The Court's holding thus was a legal, rather than a 
factual, matter and one that does not directly or impliedly take 
issue with the relevant facts found by the Superior Court. 
         And so, although we must defer to the Superior Court's 
factual determinations left undisturbed by the state Supreme 
Court, we review the legal ruling of the state Supreme Court to 
see whether it was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established federal law."  28 U.S.C.  
2254.  Accordingly, we must explore the relevant federal law.   
         In Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977), a 
defendant in a state case was required to complete a printed form 
used by the trial court in connection with guilty pleas.  One of 
the questions asked whether the defendant understood he could be 
imprisoned for a minimum of ten years to life.  The defendant 
wrote "Yes" in response.  The other pertinent inquiry was whether 
"the Solicitor, or your lawyer, or any policeman, law officer or 
anyone else made any promises or threat to you to influence you 
to plead guilty."  Id. at 66.  The defendant answered "No."   
         After being sentenced to seventeen to twenty-one years 
in prison, the defendant filed a petition in federal court 
alleging that before he entered his plea, his attorney had led 
him to believe that as a result of an agreement with the 
Solicitor and the judge the sentence would be no more than ten 
years.  The defendant also asserted that he had been instructed 
to answer the questions on the court's form as he had done.   
         The Supreme Court held that Allison's habeas corpus 
petition should not have been dismissed simply because of his 
answers to the questions at the plea proceeding.  The Court 
commented that "the barrier of the plea or sentencing proceeding 
record, although imposing, is not invariably insurmountable."  
Id. at 74.  Consequently, "the federal courts cannot fairly adopt 
a per se ruling excluding all possibility that a defendant's 
representations at the time his guilty plea was accepted were so 
much the product of such factors as misunderstanding, duress, or 
misrepresentation by others as to make the guilty plea a 
constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment."  Id. at 75.  
         The Allison opinion cited Fontaine v. United States, 
411 U.S. 213 (1973), which held that in a collateral proceeding a 
prisoner may not ordinarily repudiate statements made to the 
sentencing judge.  However, the Court observed that no procedural 
device for taking guilty pleas is so perfect as to justify a per 
se rule making it "uniformly invulnerable to subsequent 
challenge."  Id. at 215.  Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 
(1984), stated in like vein, "a guilty plea entered by one fully 
aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of 
any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own 
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to 
discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentations (including 
unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises 
that are by their nature improper as having no proper 
relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g., bribes)."   
         In Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317 (3d Cir. 1994), a state 
prisoner sought relief from his sentence of incarceration because 
his attorney had promised probation if a guilty plea were 
entered.  In directing an evidentiary hearing, we cited cases 
holding that guilty pleas are not voluntary where they are 
induced by misleading statements of defense counsel.  Id. at 320- 
21. (citing Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1537 (3d Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Marzgliano, 588 F.2d 395, 399 (3d Cir. 1978); 
United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 587 (3d Cir. 1974)). 
         This brief review provides the background against which 
we review the state Supreme Court's holding in its memorandum 
opinion.   
         The issue before us may properly be described as a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which had the effect 
of producing an involuntary plea.  Although the claim has two 
phases, the question is actually a unitary one.  The 
misrepresentation of the applicable law about the appealability 
of the double jeopardy issue vitiates voluntariness unless it can 
be shown that the trial court addressed that point so clearly in 
the colloquy that it cancelled out counsel's advice and left 
petitioners with no doubt on the correct legal principle.   
         As noted earlier, however, the trial court did not 
mention the double jeopardy issue.  As the Superior Court 
observed, there was nothing to put the trial court on notice that 
petitioners believed a nolo plea preserved the right to appeal on 
double jeopardy.  The lack of any discussion on that point by the 
trial judge could reasonably have led petitioners to believe 
their attorneys' advice had been valid.   
         It is worth noting that the trial judge, in referring 
to the nolo contendere plea, told petitioners:  "Now as far as 
sentencing is concerned, [a nolo contendere plea] is the same as 
pleading guilty."  (emphasis added).  Arguably, the comments 
limiting the scope of the nolo plea, together with the trial 
judge's later reference to appeal rights being restricted to 
whether "the sentence was lawful," were not so clear as to lead a 
reasonable person to believe the double jeopardy issue did not 
survive.   
         To the extent that the state Supreme Court appears to 
have adopted a per se rule that a defendant's facially incorrect 
responses during a plea colloquy bar claims for involuntariness, 
the holding is contrary to clearly established federal law as 
articulated in Allison and the other opinions we have cited.  It 
follows that the reversal of the Superior Court's order resulted 
in a denial of the petitioners' constitutional rights. 
         The Superior Court's factual findings and conclusions 
were consistent with federal constitutional requirements.  In 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985), in discussing the 
effect of ineffective assistance of counsel on a guilty plea, the 
Supreme Court stated "the defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial."  See also United States v. Nahodil, 36 F.3d 323, 326 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
         Based on the Superior Court's findings, petitioners 
here have met that burden and we are persuaded that they are 
entitled to relief in the federal courts. 
                       IV.  Scope of Relief 
         That conclusion brings us to a consideration of 
appropriate form of relief.  In Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 
301 (3d Cir. 1988), we held that because federal courts should 
not interfere with a state's conduct of its litigation, a 
district court should not directly order a state to grant a 
defendant an appeal.  Moreover, a state should be given the 
opportunity to correct its own errors and federal remedies should 
be designed to enable state courts to fulfill their 
constitutional obligations to the defendant.  Heiser v. Ryan, 15 
F.3d 299, 306 (3d Cir. 1994).  In Barry, we concluded that it was 
permissible for the federal court to direct the petitioner's 
release unless within thirty days the state granted him the right 
to appeal.  864 F.2d at 301.  See also Herrera v. Collins, 506 
U.S. 390, 403 (1993).   
         In the case before us, one option would be for the 
state to permit petitioners to withdraw their guilty pleas and go 
to trial.  It occurs to us, however, that there may be another 
form of relief more closely tailored to the petitioner's avowed 
deprivation -- the right to appellate review of the double 
jeopardy issue.   
         In a number of cases, Pennsylvania appellate courts 
have upheld the power of the Common Pleas courts to grant the 
right of appeal nunc pro tunc.  In Commonwealth v. West, 482 A.2d 
1339, 1343 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
observed that when counsel has been found ineffective for failure 
to file an appeal, permission for nunc pro tunc appeals had been 
allowed.  See Bond v. Fulcomer, 864 F.2d 306, 312 (3d Cir. 1989).  
In West, the Court granted leave to file a petition for allocatur 
to the state Supreme Court nunc pro tunc when the defendant's 
counsel had failed to do so.  Similar relief was allowed in 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 394 A.2d 582 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978), 
Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 563 A.2d 1244 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), and 
Larkin v. Commonwealth, 555 A.2d 954 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).  
         In Commonwealth v. Terreforte, 564 A.2d 479 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1989), the Superior Court was faced with a situation 
analogous to the case presently before us.  Although the 
defendant pleaded guilty, he expressly reserved the right, based 
on his counsel's advice, to appeal a speedy trial issue.  After a 
post conviction relief hearing, the trial court granted the right 
to appeal the speedy trial issue nunc pro tunc.  The Superior 
Court refused to recognize the conditional plea and did not 
address the speedy trial issue.  Instead, the Superior Court 
allowed the defendant to withdraw his plea because it had been 
based on incorrect advice from his counsel and the trial court. 
         In a brief order, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded with directions to review the speedy trial 
claim.  Commonwealth v. Terreforte, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991).  
Thus, the Court allowed appellate review of the precise issue 
that the defendant had reserved in entering his guilty plea.  In 
effect, the state Supreme Court enforced the provisions of the 
"conditional plea," although it did not discuss that procedure as 
such. 
         A similar disposition of the present case would be 
sufficient to remedy the constitutional violation.  The double 
jeopardy claim is a discrete, and perhaps dispositive, issue that 
could be resolved in this fashion.  See e.g., United States v. 
Bentz, 21 F.3d 37 (3d Cir. 1994) (a defendant may preserve a 
precise issue for appellate review and enter a conditional plea); 
United States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1975) (approving 
the use of conditional pleas of guilty); see also Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 11(a)(2). 
         Accordingly, the orders of the district courts are 
reversed and the cases are remanded with directions that 
petitioners be released from custody within 120 days, unless 
within that time the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania allows 
petitioners to withdraw their pleas and grants new trials, or in 
the alternative, petitioners are granted the right to file 
conditional appeals nunc pro tunc challenging the denial of their 
motions of acquittal on double jeopardy grounds. 
 
 
 
